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Dividing Democracy: Three Arguments for States’ Rights
Today, many perceive states’ rights as an obsolete or unjust political doctrine. Indeed, in
serving as an ideological basis against centralized national power and helping to preserve slavery
and segregation, states’ rights seem to have historically opposed justice and progress. Recent
developments such as the need for swift action in foreign affairs and slowing the spread of new
diseases appear to have rendered states’ rights inadequate for solving modern challenges.
Meanwhile, calls for universal justice and the protection of certain rights have generated doubt
over the independent decision-making powers of states. But is there an interpretation of states’
rights that does not augment these pressing problems, and may such an interpretation be renewed
within modern American democracy?
Our attempt to answer these questions is immediately faced with a misconception
surrounding states’ rights. It is generally held that states’ rights is a single and unchanging doctrine
whose sole end is the dissipation of federal authority for its own sake. Within the American
political tradition, however, there exist competing theories of states’ rights, including the theories
of the Anti-Federalists, John C. Calhoun, and Alexis de Tocqueville. While these figures are not
the only proponents of states’ rights in American political thought, I limit my analysis to these
three sources.
I begin with the Anti-Federalist position on federalism. This thought argues for robust states’
rights. It asserts that strong, independent state governments are the best means of guaranteeing the
natural rights asserted at the Founding. I then turn to the thought of John C. Calhoun, who developed
with the greatest depth and clarity the view of states’ rights which overshadows contemporary
debates surrounding federalism. In particular, he outlines a vision of states’ rights that protects the
influence of political minorities in the form of state government which, by offering defense
mechanisms for the self-government of the states, in practice leads to the preservation of the right of
some to make others unequal. Finally, I examine Tocqueville’s interpretation of federalism. His ideas
focus on the substantive social benefits of localism, rather than focusing on governmental and
constitutional arguments. Tocqueville’s interpretation identifies townships, associations, and other
local institutions as the best means of promoting political freedom; localism, according to him,
allows citizens to participate in political life while educating them in democratic virtues. Ultimately,
I argue that this Tocquevillian view of federalism is both compatible with and necessary for
sustaining the modern American regime. By emphasizing the need for democratic virtues rather than
formal institutions, Tocqueville’s federalism combats the degrading effects of centralization on both
the mechanisms of democracy and the souls of the citizens.
Natural Rights and States’ Rights – The Anti-Federalists
States’ rights as a constitutional theory found its first forceful defense during the
ratification debates, when the Anti-Federalists voiced their skepticism of stronger national power.
To be sure, a variety of other interpretations of states’ rights positions were put forward during
the Founding Era and the following decades by figures such as Thomas Jefferson. But it was the
Anti-Federalists who collectively articulated one the most comprehensive views of states’ rights
during this time.
In their opposition to the Constitution, the Anti-Federalists appealed to natural rights as
the basis for their interpretation of states’ rights. While forming a government requires each
individual to relinquish some of their natural liberties, the purpose of an artificial government is
to secure the fundamental natural rights of the members of the political community. From this
perspective, the Anti-Federalists argue that the national government is too distant to reflect the
will, and thereby guarantee the natural rights, of the people effectively. It can at best provide a
“crude uniform rule,” one that ignores the unique conditions of the states and risks giving rise to
despotism (Storing 1981, 16). But if the national government is incapable of ruling with a view to
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the interests of each state, then individual liberty and happiness, the legitimate objects of artificial
government, cannot be secured. A centralized national government is thus not constructed with
the aim of guaranteeing natural rights. Hence, for the Anti-Federalists, who are united in their
opinions about “the nature of man or the ends of political life,” the solution to the problem of
centralized national government is preserving the authority that state governments have over their
citizens (Storing 1981, 5).
For democratic government to secure natural rights, there must exist a closeness in
proximity between the people and their government. The Anti-Federalists, therefore, favor state
governments. Aside from its inability to govern the diverse people of each state effectively, the
Anti-Federalists argue that representation in a large, centralized republic will be too few and out
of touch, taking on an impersonal, if aristocratic, tendency. Moreover, the Constitution appears to
diminish the influence of state representatives who “possess similar feelings, views and interests”
with their constituents (The Federal Farmer 1985, 51). Crucial to preventing these effects is
assigning state governments as the “immediate guardians” of the people, since states are more
likely to command the confidence, trust, and affection of the people than a distant national
government (Storing 1985, 115). As such, this proper constitutional form not only guarantees
natural rights but has the additional benefit of promoting democratic virtues — the attachment to
one’s laws and institutions, the “devotion to fellow citizens and to country” — that can only be
fostered within the states, where the sentiments of the people are alike (Storing 1981, 20). Thus,
while the Anti-Federalist’ constitutional theory focuses on the protection of natural rights, it also
sees a connection between these rights and democratic virtues.
If the ends of the Anti-Federalist position are the protection of natural rights, it is also
premised on a hostility to federal supremacy. Fearful that the new federal system of the
Constitution radically consolidates power within the national government, they held that the state
governments should remain relatively equal with the national government, lest the “liberties of
this people” be made dependent on it (The Federal Farmer 1985, 43). The national government
will legislate with a view to all states, applying laws uniformly without attention to the particular
conditions of each. But because states represent communities with distinct interests, the AntiFederalist position implicitly accommodates states which might ultimately oppose the spirit of
self-government and universal extension of natural rights. As a constitutional theory, the thought
of the Anti-Federalist can secure or violate natural rights. The philosophic attachment to universal
natural rights and the constitutional arguments favoring independent states, therefore, are
separable.
Political Minorities and States’ Rights – Calhoun
John C. Calhoun sees states’ rights as a protection of the independent self-government of
the states themselves, appealing to history to argue that they are the primary locus of political
attachment. At the core of his position, and in contrast to the Anti-Federalists, is an explicit
rejection of natural rights, denying the universality of freedom and equality on the grounds that
such rights depended on the unique, historical conditions of political communities. The “great and
dangerous errors” of the American republic lied in the belief that all are born free and equal, “than
which nothing can be more unfounded and false” (Calhoun 2007, 43). Freedom and equality are
not natural but conventional; “when forced on a people unfit for it” these principles will become a
“curse” for government (Calhoun 2007, 41). Accordingly, majority rule in the form of a centralized
government poses a glaring threat to the self-government of states because of its potential to place
universal moral and political standards upon the historically contingent standards of the individual
states.
For Calhoun, this risk prompted the need for a concurrent system in which all political
groups, or states, have equal power in making and vetoing national laws. Like the Anti-Federalists,
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his theory of states’ rights emphasizes the need for certain democratic or political virtues and,
more importantly, proper constitutional forms. For Calhoun, however, such virtues and forms
demanded a system of concurrent majorities in which institutional powers are placed in the hands
of political minorities to ensure compromise between political interests. By empowering and
protecting the rights of minorities (represented in the states), the concurrent system will secure the
constitutional forms necessary to independent self-government while also promoting salutary
political virtues through uniting each interest behind the pursuit of the “common good of the
whole” (Calhoun 2007, 12, 19).
An immediate consequence of the concurrent system is the possibility that national policy
can be stymied if states believe it to be unconstitutional. The House, Senate and President do not
necessarily need the consensus of each state prior to making important national policy decisions,
but the individual states retain the right to nullify an act of national policy after the fact. The effect
is that the states are left to pursue their own interests without the interference of an energetic
national government, while the national government remains effectual in matters that demand
speed and dispatch. If this process threatens the national government from settling contentious
policies, then the concurrent system implies that most political matters will be left to the states.
Indeed, Calhoun admitted that political interests are unwilling to compromise on unurgent
matters due to personal pride and self-interest. So only when there is broad social consensus, or
when, in moments of crisis, the “fatal consequences” of inaction forced interests to compromise,
will the federal government be an effective instrument of policy (Calhoun 2007, 48-49). At the
same time, this theory entails the denial of natural rights claims that would otherwise be binding
on all states—most notably through the institution of slavery. The elevation of state-level selfgovernment, therefore, at once protects political minorities while allowing for pervasive
inequalities and disparaging the demands of universal justice.
Democratic Virtues and Localism – Tocqueville
While American sources focus on state governments as the most reliable means of
preserving natural rights or of securing historical political communities from a centralized
government, Alexis de Tocqueville points to localism as the source for securing the spirit of
liberty. For this French observer, local government supports and develops the political freedom
necessary to resist a potentially despotic, centralized government.
Political freedom, assumed to be an essential component of a healthy democracy, is in fact
threatened by the excesses of equality which shape the “the laws, customs, and ideas” of a
democratic society (Tocqueville 2002, 45). In a democracy, Tocqueville saw that the spirit of
liberty and the spirit of equality conflict with each other. Liberty allows for inequality, yet all of
history, Tocqueville observers, is a history of the advancement of equality. Even within a
democratic regime, equality is such a fundamental desire that citizens are more committed to
advancing it than to maintaining their political freedom. Due to the forces of materialism and
individualism, Tocqueville argues that equality will move beyond the political sphere, degrading
citizens to the pursuit of mediocre pleasures and making them apathetic toward public life. Thus,
the desire for equality will ultimately prepare citizens to relinquish themselves, and the spirit of
liberty, to the centralized, mild despotism of the state; one which will secure their private welfare
at the expense of their freedom (Tocqueville 2002, 485).
Local institutions in the form of townships, juries, and other associations provide the space
for the spirit of liberty to flourish amid equality. Through exercising their liberty, citizens are
inculcated with the virtues necessary for counteracting individualism and materialism. Among the
conditions that make localism possible in America is the lack of administrative centralization,
where matters dealing with specific parts of the political whole are left to those parts instead of a
centralized bureaucracy (Tocqueville 2002, 82). This decentralization strengthens the autonomy
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of local institutions that offer a “free and strong corporation that [the citizen] is a part of and that
is worth his trouble to seek to direct” (Tocqueville 2002, 64). Furthermore, local institutions play
into the desire of ambitious citizens by allowing them to participate in politics, capture the
affection of their peers, and exemplify human greatness. In so doing, these citizens push back
against the overwhelming and impersonal force of mild despotism and therefore sustain both an
amount of freedom and equality within a democracy.
More than encouraging the practice of freedom, however, localism raises the quality of
character among citizens. Indeed, through local institutions individual weakness, which will
otherwise lead to individualism, brings citizens “closer to one another,” showing them that their
individual interests are linked with the interests of others; that the fulfilment of their private selfinterest requires the fulfilment of the public interest (Tocqueville 2002, 487). And if cooperation
with others first arises from necessity, localism turns cooperation into a habit and taste. It not only
instills the “value of public benevolence” in citizens but also educates them in “the nature of [their]
duties” and “the extent of [their] rights” (Tocqueville 2002, 65). Localism thus improves the
character and souls of democratic citizens; for if centralization places citizens in a state “below the
level of humanity,” localism makes possible the active, political way of life (Tocqueville 2002,
665).
Conclusion
In this article, I have introduced and considered three foundations for states’ rights. But
this examination has been made in light of the fact that modern America is skeptical about states’
rights. A recent national poll concerning the approval of state governments by their citizens
confirms this view: while a 2022 Pew poll finds that more Americans have a favorable opinion of
their state government than the federal government, 37 of the 50 state governments are under the
unified control of one political party (Ballotpedia 2022). And in terms of population, about 75.7%
of Americans live in a state with unified government (Ballotpedia 2022). It seems likely, then, that
Americans are more favorable about their state governments not because they are favorable of
states’ rights, but because they are favorable of the partisan politics of their state, which they want
to see exist at the federal level.
I think that the skepticism of states’ rights traces its roots to the interpretations of states’
rights expounded by the Anti-Federalists and Calhoun, which focus on opposition to centralized
federal authority and its institutional forms. Our usual hesitation toward states’ rights, however,
overlooks the more substantive interpretation presented by Tocqueville, which shows that
overcoming divisive forces such as individualism and materialism may require some reformulated
understanding of states’ rights.
Most interpretations of states’ rights attempt to solve the problem of centralization by
relying on democratic forms, arguing that strong and independent state governments that combat
centralization are sufficient to make the case. But Tocqueville, arguing more explicitly about what
centralization does to the human soul and the quality of one’s character, offers a more robust
defense for local governments to those of us living in a different time with different institutional
expectations. He shows more emphatically than the Anti-Federalists and Calhoun that local
institutions cannot operate without virtue, and the habits of and tastes for local self-government
are constantly needed to push back against the degrading effects of centralization.
Perhaps resisting the mild despotism of our time, the administrative and regulatory state,
requires a renewed commitment to localism. Such a commitment, of course, requires its own
institutional and constitutional arguments. But we should not confuse the forms for the substance,
and Tocqueville more than others shows why a healthy life in the modern world requires us to
think about the “rights” of states and localities.
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